Is privatization in a country related to the stringency of its employment protection laws (EPL)-and, if so, how? On one hand, stringent EPL may reduce investor demand for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by imposing restrictions on retrenchment of employees. On the other hand, stringent EPL may lead governments to increase the supply of privatizeable SOEs if they lower union opposition to privatization by reducing fears of employee retrenchment. Using privatization deals in fourteen European countries from 1978-2003 and all the changes in EPL within a country, we find strong evidence that the strength of EPL is negatively correlated with privatization. Using a variety of tests that account for the potential endogeneity of EPL, we show that it is plausible to conclude that stringent EPL deter privatization. Our study contributes to the law and finance and privatization literatures by being the first to examine the effect of country-level employment legislation on privatization.
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Employment Protection Laws and Privatization
In this study, we ask the following question: Is privatization in a country related to the stringency of its employment protection laws? Studying this question is important for several reasons. First, privatization, broadly defined as the deliberate sale by a government of state-owned enterprises or assets to private economic agents, has been a centerpiece of national economic policy over the last three decades.
1 Similarly, employment protection law remains an important policy instrument that affects economic efficiency and employee welfare (Allard, 2005) . In fact, few other combinations of countrylevel variables as employment protection laws and privatization affect so many economic agents simultaneously--workers, firms, government, investors and even consumers--and in such powerful ways.
Second, there is a compelling, yet simple, theoretical reason why employment protection laws are likely to be a key determinant of privatization. Politicians exercise control over the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and organized labor, particularly labor unions, represent a key interest group to which politicians cater (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996) ). As Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue, maximizing employment in the state-owned enterprises remains the implicit objective of politicians, since disbursing patronage to organized labor constitutes an important tool for politicians to create and/or enhance their political capital. Not surprisingly then, SOEs employ excess workers and employ them relatively inefficiently when compared to privately owned firms (see Banerji and Sabot (1994) ; Dewenter and Malatesta (2000) ; and Dinç and Gupta (2011) ). Since new private investors may need to retrench employees in their drive to maximize shareholder value, politicians fear that privatization will result in large scale labor force restructuring either before or after divestiture, and thus adversely affect the key voting support that organized labor provides. Since labor retrenchment is regulated in most countries through employment protection laws, privatization and employment protection laws (EPL) may be inextricably linked at the country level.
Thus, the question that we study in this paper is important because: (i) it links two country-level variables that critically affect a broad spectrum of stakeholders in an economy; and (ii) answers to this question are of interest not only to researchers in the areas of law and finance and privatization but also to national policy-makers.
Theoretically, stringent EPL may either encourage or discourage privatization. By imposing restrictions on the retrenchment of employees, stringent EPL may constrain a new owner's ability to increase firm efficiency through staff reductions post-sale, thereby reducing investor demand to buy SOEs and discouraging privatization in a country. On the other hand, since stringent EPL may reduce fears of retrenchment of employees post-privatization, stringent EPL could encourage privatization by lowering union opposition to privatization, thereby encouraging politicians to privatize more SOEs.
In general, it is difficult to predict whether the supply-side or demand-side effects of EPL on privatization will dominate in equilibrium. Using information on the number (quantity) as well as the value (price) of privatization deals in fourteen OECD countries, we investigate which of these two effects dominates. While reduced demand and enhanced supply due to stringent EPL work in tandem to reduce the value of privatization transactions (price), their effects on the number of privatizations (quantity) oppose each other; only if the demand-side (supply-side) effect dominates will stringent EPL lead to fewer (more) privatizations. Examining both effects together also enables us to study the causal effect of EPL on privatization by considerably alleviating econometric concerns stemming from potential endogeneity of EPL. We find that stringent EPL are strongly negatively correlated with privatization, and, quite plausibly, dampen privatization.
We obtain the data on privatizations from the Privatization Barometer, which contains a comprehensive list of divestment transactions from 1978 to 2003 onwards for western European Union countries. We use the EPL index presented in Allard (2005) , who analyzes in detail the evolution of employment protection legislation across the OECD countries from 1950 to 2003 to generate the EPL index. This index enables us to study the relationship between privatization and employment protection laws using the universe of all changes in laws pertaining to employment protection in these countries.
Additionally, this index exhibits considerable within-country variation that is generated by specific law changes relating to employment protection. 2 The EPL index also covers comprehensively all aspects of employment protection legislation for the OECD countries. This index has been constructed by surveying existing laws and regulations in OECD countries; the final scores have been reviewed and corrected by each national government. The index covers eighteen aspects of employment protection legislation grouped into three broad categories: (i) laws protecting workers with regular contracts; (ii) laws affecting workers with fixed-term/temporary contracts; and (iii) regulations concerning collective dismissals.
Since the primary variable of interest, EPL, varies at the country level, we conduct our first set of tests by aggregating at the country, year level the number of privatizations as well as the total value of the privatization deals (in current US$ billions). Second, by interacting the country-level EPL with a proxy for the fear of employee retrenchment in an industry, we generate a country, industry, year level measure of "effective EPL," which reflects the power and relevance of EPL in a given industry in a country. We then use this "effective EPL" measure to conduct tests at the country, industry, year level. By conducting our tests at the country, year and country, industry, year levels, we avoid many of the econometric issues that manifest in firm-level tests. Apart from the fact that neither EPL nor "effective EPL" varies at the firm-level, unobserved firm-specific factors coinciding with the timing of privatization would be a firstorder determinant of whether or not a particular firm is privatized. Such unobserved firm-specific factors coinciding with the timing of privatization would cloud inference of the effect of EPL on privatization.
As a first step, to establish the correlation between EPL and privatization we employ fixed effects panel regressions using the country, year sample, where we include fixed effects for the country and year of privatization. By accounting for country-specific factors as well as global trends in privatization, these tests measure a difference-in-difference effect of an EPL change within a given country: the before-after difference in privatization in a country where EPL changed vis-à-vis this difference in a country where EPL did not change. Second, we augment the fixed effects specification with country-specific trends.
These country-specific trends enable us to account for the fact that there has been an increasing trend towards privatization in several countries and the possibility that omitted factors driving this trend are correlated with EPL. Furthermore, while the country fixed effects account for average differences between the de jure and de facto EPL due to the differences in the enforcement of EPL, the country specific trends account for time varying changes in such enforcement.
We control for other time-varying determinants of privatization as well. First, privatization programs may be disproportionately larger in bigger and richer countries. To control for such nonlinear effects, we include the logarithm of the GDP of a country. Second, we include the cumulative number as well as the cumulative value of privatizations that have occurred up through the previous year to account for any "inventory depletion effect," or the fact that greater privatization up through time t-1 may reduce the inventory of privatizeable firms and thus reduce the likelihood of privatization in time t. Third, we include the level of stock market development in the country and its creditor rights to control for the development of equity and credit markets in the country. In both set of tests, those that employ country and year fixed effects and those that employ country-specific trends and year fixed effects, we find that EPL changes are strongly negatively correlated with the number and value of privatizations in a country.
This correlation is statistically significant and lasts up to two years after the EPL changes. The effect is economically significant as well: a median change in the EPL index within a country, ceteris paribus, is associated with a 7.6% change in the number of privatization transactions, with the effect being greater for EPL decreases than for EPL increases.
We recognize that the key challenge to attributing a causal effect of EPL on privatization stems from the fact that both these variables may be simultaneously determined, since national governments decide both EPL and privatization. We note that while the supply-side effect potentially suffers from this econometric concern, the demand-side effect is largely immune. The supply-side effect of EPL on privatization manifests through government action, and this same government also enacts or changes the EPL. In contrast, the demand side effect of EPL on privatization manifests through investors, who do not get to decide on the EPL in a country. 3 As a result, the concern that EPL and privatization are simultaneously determined is largely absent on the demand side. Since supply-side effects oppose the demand-side effects with respect to the effect of EPL on the number of privatizations (quantity), the presence of any supply-side effects, including those due to co-determination of EPL and privatization, stack the odds against us finding the negative effect of EPL on the number of privatizations. Since we find a robust negative effect of EPL on the number of privatizations, it is fairly compelling that stringent EPL discourage privatization.
Nevertheless, to buttress the claim that stringent EPL dampens privatization significantly, we attempt to further alleviate simultaneity concerns through several additional tests. First, we follow Gupta (2005) in estimating the dynamic GMM model developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) , in which we instrument EPL using instruments from within the panel. By treating EPL as a pre-determined variable--by allowing for the fact that unobserved factors influencing privatization through time t could influence EPL at time t--we relax the assumption of strict exogeneity in the fixed effects panel regressions. This approach minimizes concerns relating to the endogeneity of EPL. Furthermore, since privatization undertaken in the past captures the "inventory depletion effect" on current privatization, including the lags of the dependent variable accounts for this effect in an econometrically robust manner. We find that the negative effect of EPL on privatization remains statistically and economically significant. We also find it reassuring that the coefficient of EPL estimated in this instance is almost identical to the estimate in our fixed effects panel regressions.
Second, in our panel regressions employing country-specific trends and year fixed effects, we directly account for the endogeneity of the EPL changes by controlling for political-economic factors that may lead to these changes: (i) the contemporaneous and lagged values of a time-varying proxy for the political leanings of a country's government, which enables us to control for a potential key determinant of EPL changes -the changes in a country's government; (ii) the contemporaneous and lagged values of yearly GDP growth rates, which account for the possibility that the political pressure for enacting stringent EPL would be greatest during periods of slow/declining economic growth (Saint-Paul, 2002 );
(iii) trade liberalization; and (iv) the share of the government in total national production each year. We find that privatization is positively correlated with GDP growth, is lower under left-wing governments, is positively correlated with trade reforms, and is negatively correlated with the government share of production in a country. Crucially, however, we find that the effect of the EPL remains statistically significant even after controlling for all these factors. In fact, using a bootstrap methodology, we test whether the coefficient of EPL differs with and without these additional variables and find that the coefficient of EPL remains unchanged even after accounting for these potential sources of endogeneity.
This reassures us that omitted factors driving privatization are unlikely to be correlated with EPL changes.
Third, by interacting the country-level EPL with the fear of employee retrenchment in an industry, we generate a country, industry, year level measure of "effective EPL," which measures the power and relevance of EPL in the country, industry to conduct tests at the country, industry, year level.
Using industry-level hiring and separation rates to proxy the fear of retrenchment in an industry in a country, we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the effect of EPL is relatively stronger in an industry where hiring is lower and/or firing is higher.
Fourth, since the United States does not form part of our sample of countries, we use proxies measuring the fear of retrenchment in U.S. industries to construct an exogenous measure of the "effective EPL" in an industry in a country by interacting this measure for the matched U.S. industry with the country-level EPL. Since the efficiency gains from shedding excess labor would be the greatest in less productive industries, the fear of retrenchment should also be greatest in the least productive industries.
Due to the underlying technology in an industry being similar across different countries, a priori, the industry-level productivity computed for the U.S. is likely to be correlated with productivity and, thus with fear of retrenchment in a given industry in a given country in our sample. In fact, in our sample we find this correlation to be 0.62. However, industry level productivity measures for the U.S. are unlikely to be correlated with either the unobserved determinants of privatization or the unobserved factors coinciding with changes in a country's EPL. We therefore use productivity measured as output per worker and output per hour in U.S. industries as an instrument for the fear of retrenchment and interact it with the country level EPL to generate an exogenous proxy for "effective EPL" in an industry, country, year. We find that the effect of the EPL index is more pronounced in less productive industries, which supports the hypothesis that the effect of stringent employment protection laws on privatization is disproportionately greater in industries where fear of retrenchment is more intense. These triple-difference tests exploiting exogenous variation in the fear of retrenchment thus provide further evidence supporting the claim that stringent EPL indeed discourage privatization.
Finally, we show that other dimensions of labor laws--such as strike regulations, antidiscrimination laws, and minimum wage legislation--do not have the same impact on privatization, which suggests that it is indeed employment protection laws that affect privatization by raising the hurdles for employee retrenchment. Thus our results are unlikely to be driven by omitted variables correlated with other frictions in the labor market.
Having alleviated the concerns stemming from possible co-determination of EPL and privatization, we investigate possible concerns relating to reverse causality. Until the changes to EPL become effective, legal hurdles relating to firing excess workers do not change. Therefore, possible reverse causality -the possibility that EPL were enacted in anticipation of future privatization transactions -is unlikely to be a significant concern. Nevertheless, we test and find that privatization through time t-1 is not correlated with EPL changes at time t. Furthermore, tests examining the dynamic effect of EPL on privatization provide added comfort of the direction of causality being from EPL to privatization and not vice-versa. Since EPL decreases lower the hurdles encountered in employee retrenchment, privatization transactions may wait for EPL decreases to manifest in law. However, this may not be the case with EPL increases since they add to the hurdles in retrenching employees.
Consistent with this argument, we find that the economic effect of EPL decreases on privatization is greater than that of EPL increases. Also, the effect of EPL decreases manifests relatively more in the short-term than in the long-term while this pattern is reversed for EPL increases.
In sum, across a plethora of tests, we find that stringent employment protection laws are negatively correlated with privatization and, quite plausibly, stringent employment protection laws may deter privatization. Our study examines the effect of country-specific legislation on privatization by investigating the effect of laws that affect a key relationship inside corporations--that between employers and employees--on the transition of corporate ownership from the state to private entities. As we explain in the next section, our study also relates to the literature on privatization and the labor economics literature relating to employment protection laws. From a policymaking standpoint, since labor restructuring is the most sensitive issue surrounding privatization, our study highlights that national governments should ease the rigidities in their labor markets before embarking on a privatization exercise.
Our study shows that such labor market reforms not only increase the likelihood of privatization but also enable the government to generate greater proceeds from the privatization itself.
This study is organized as follows. We review the related literature in Section I while the hypotheses we develop and test are presented in Section II. Section III presents the data and proxies we examine. Section IV presents empirical results and robustness checks, while Section V concludes.
I. Related Literature
Our study relates broadly to three streams of the financial economics literature: the literature on law and finance, the literature on privatization, and the labor economics literature relating to employment protection laws. In the law and finance literature (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997 , 1998 , La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1999 , our paper is the first to examine the effect of country level laws on privatization. Our study specifically relates to that of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) , who examine the effect of legal shareholder protection on corporate ownership around the world. In contrast, we examine the effect of laws affecting the relationship between employers and employees on the ownership structure of firms, specifically the transition from ownership by the state to ownership by private investors.
Second, our study relates to the literature examining how privatization impacts the labor force.
Some studies show that privatization increases the likelihood of labor force restructuring; Chong, Guillen, and Lopez-de-Silanes (2011) show that 78% of the SOEs in their sample reduce their labor force before privatization, while D'Souza and Megginson (1999) document significant declines in employment postprivatization in their multi-national study. The following single-country/ single-company studies also document significant declines in employment post-privatization: Ramamurti (1997, Ferrocarilla Argentinos), LaPorta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999, Mexico), Laurin and Bozec (2001, Canadian National Railroad), Omran (2001, Egypt) , Arin and Okten (2002, Turkey) , and Boardman, Laurin, and Vining (2003, Canada) . On the other hand, the multi-national studies of Galal, Jones, Tandon, and Vogelsang (1992), Megginson, Nash, and van Randenborgh (1994) , Cosset (1998), and Teledgy (2006) show that employment increases significantly after privatization, at least relative to a benchmark of comparable firms, as does Gupta's (2005) study of partial privatizations in India. Many other studies--summarized in Megginson and Netter (2001) , Murrell (2002), Megginson (2005) , and Estrin, Hanousek , Kocenda , and Svejnar (2009)--document insignificant changes in divested firm employment levels, despite very large increases in sales and efficiency. Brown, et al. (2010) show that privatization does not systematically lead to large job cuts in Hungary, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine, despite significant productivity improvements, because divested firms increase output enough to largely offset the per-worker productivity increases. Even Chong, Guillen, and Lopez-de-Silanes (2011) show that the new private owners of divested companies re-hire laid off workers in almost 44% of all the cases examined.
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In contrast to the ambiguous evidence regarding privatization's impact on divested firms' employment levels, there is overwhelming empirical support for the proposition that privatization improves the financial and operating performance of divested companies. The empirical evidence is consistent for developed and developing countries, as summarized in Megginson and Netter (2001) , Djankov and Murrell (2002) , Megginson (2005) , Boubakri, Cosset, and Guedhami (2005) , and Estrin, Hanousek, Kocenda, and Svejnar (2009) . Over time, private investors come to predict this potential for performance improvements and thus become willing to pay top prices for SOEs where they will have the scope to make value-maximizing improvements post-sale. This naturally gives divesting governments an incentive to privatize firms with as few restrictions in place as possible, since doing so will maximize sale proceeds. Finally, Choi, Lee, and Megginson (2010) show that investors who purchase shares of privatization IPOs and hold them long-term earn significantly positive market adjusted returns-which contrasts sharply to the negative long-run returns earned by investors who purchase private-sector IPOs.
Third, our study relates to the literature examining the real effects of employment protection laws. Lazear (1990) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) argue that employment protection laws hinder job destruction and thereby lead to less job creation and higher unemployment. Botero, LaPorta, Lopez-deSilanes, and Shleifer (2004) find empirically that heavier regulation of labor leads to adverse consequences for labor market participation and unemployment. Atanassov and Kim (2009) examine the interaction between labor laws and investor protection laws and find that rigid employment laws lead to higher likelihood of value-reducing major asset sales, particularly when investor protection is weak. They find that assets are sold to forestall layoffs, even if these asset sales hurt performance. In their study of manufacturing performance in Indian states, Besley and Burgess (2004) find that pro-worker labor laws are associated with lower levels of investment, productivity, and output. Bassanini, Nunziata and Venn (2009) also show that mandatory dismissal regulations in OECD countries have a depressing effect on productivity growth in industries where layoff restrictions are more likely to be binding. In contrast, Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2010) show that laws that make dismissal of employees difficult can have a positive effect on innovation and thereby economic growth. Our study contributes to this literature by documenting the negative effect of employment protection laws on privatization.
II. Empirical Hypotheses
Compared to profit-maximizing privately-owned firms, public enterprises employ excess labor which renders them relatively inefficient (Laffont and Tirole (1991); Shleifer and Vishny (1994) ; Boycko, Shelifer, and Vishny (1996) ; Dewenter and Malatesta (2000) Figure 1 about here **** As Figure 1 shows, reduced demand and enhanced supply due to stringent EPL work in tandem to lower the value of privatization (price). Therefore, we predict that:
HYPOTHESIS 1 (NET EFFECT OF EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LAWS ON VALUE OF PRIVATIZATIONS):
Stringent employment protection laws in a country lead to a lower value of privatization deals in the country.
Since both the demand and supply side effects reinforce each other with respect to the price paid by investors for an SOE, the effect of EPL on the value of privatization transactions does not allow us to infer which of the two effects dominates. However, as seen in Figure 1 , reduced demand and enhanced supply have opposing effects on the number of privatizations (quantity). Therefore, the effect of EPL on We also note that since the supply-side effect of EPL on privatization outlined above manifests through the government, which also decides on the EPL, the supply-side channel suffers from the econometric challenge of privatization and EPL being simultaneously determined. In their study of the determinants of EPL changes across a large sample of countries, Campos and Nugent (2011) find that increases in employment protection are negatively associated with economic growth and positively associated with trade liberalization.
In contrast, the demand side effect of EPL on privatization manifests through investors, who do not get to decide on a country's EPL. Campos and Nugent (2011) find that EPL changes are not correlated with the legal origin of a country, and since legal investor protection is primarily determined by the legal origin of a country (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997, 1998) , the Campos and Nugent (2011) finding implies that investors are unlikely to decide on the EPL in a country. As a result, the concern that EPL and privatization are simultaneously determined is largely absent on the demand side.
III. Data and Proxies
This section describes the data we employ, our proxies for privatization, and the EPL Index.
A. Proxies for Privatization
Our privatization data comes from Privatization Barometer (PB), 6 which is the principal online database of privatization transactions in the European Union (EU). PB is a fully searchable database that contains a comprehensive list of privatization transactions from 1978 onwards for all EU countries. PB is the official provider of privatization data to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank.
We employ two different proxies for privatization: (i) the number of privatization deals; and (ii) the total value of privatization deals (in current US$ billions). For our tests, we summarize the proxies for privatization at two levels of aggregation: the country, year level and the country, industry, year level. with respect to the number of privatizations and the dollar value of these transactions.
**** Insert Table I about here ****
B. Employment Protection Laws
In order to analyze the impact of EPL on privatization, we exploit the time-series variation generated by changes in these laws within countries. We use the Employment Protection Law (EPL) index sourced from Allard (2005), who analyzes the evolution of employment protection legislation across OECD countries for each year from 1950 to 2003 to generate the EPL index. This index offers two key advantages in the context of our study. 7 First, the long time-series, which captures comprehensively all country-level changes in EPL, enables us to examine within-country correlation between EPL changes and privatization, which reduces the econometric concerns that arise in a cross-country setting. Second, the EPL index provides complete coverage of all aspects of employment protection legislation in OECD countries. This index has been constructed by surveying existing law and regulations in OECD countries and by assigning numerical scores for every aspect of employment protection legislation. The final scores have been obtained after necessary reviews and corrections by each of the national governments. The EPL index covers eighteen aspects of employment protection legislation grouped into three broad categories:
(i) laws protecting those workers who have signed regular contracts with their employers ("Regular Contracts"); (ii) laws affecting workers with fixed-term/temporary contracts or contracts with temporary work agencies ("Temporary Contracts"); and (iii) regulations applying to collective dismissals ("Collective Dismissals").
The "Regular Contracts" index focuses on the procedural requirements that need to be followed once a decision is taken to fire an employee who has been provided a regular employment contract, the mandatory notice period, the severance pay requirements, and the prevailing standards of and penalties for "unfair" dismissals. EPL protect workers covered under "Regular Contracts" from redundancies resulting from economic factors. Such economic factors include bankruptcy, complete or partial liquidation of the enterprise, staff cuts due to changes in the production technology or the structure of the enterprise as well as due to financial problems of the employer. In such a case the redundant worker enjoys protection in the form of a notice period combined with severance pay. Other reasons for employment termination with notice include long-term absence from work for health reasons, unsatisfactory work performance due to health problems or inadequate qualifications, and refusal to move to another locality in connection with the relocation of the enterprise or of one of its parts. In some countries, age and eligibility for old-age pension are also valid reasons for employment termination with employer notice, while in other countries such a termination is unlawful. The "Temporary Contracts" index evaluates the conditions under which these types of contracts can be offered, the maximum number of successive renewals and the maximum cumulative duration of a temporary employment contract. The "Collective Dismissals" index defines a collective dismissal and specifies the notification requirements provided by law and the associated delays and costs for the employers. This time-series variation within a country is generated by specific law changes relating to employment protection. For example, in France, laws relating to the notification of employee dismissals were weakened in 1986. Before this law change, an employer was required to provide the employee with written reasons for his/her dismissal. Furthermore, the employer had to obtain the permission of a state/local body prior to any individual dismissal. In 1986, this law was changed so that the employer only had to notify the state/local body prior to an individual dismissal. Consistent with this law change, in Figure 2 , we see the EPL index for France decreasing in 1986. Table II lists major changes in EPL in our sample of countries. This list of changes is derived from the changes described in Bertola, Boeri, and Cazes (1999) and the OECD Employment Outlook (1999). Table II about here **** Table III shows that the EPL index for our sample of countries ranges from a minimum of 1.3 to a maximum of 4.1. The average value of the EPL index is 2.6, and the median is a very similar 2.5. The time-series variation within countries as well as the cross-sectional variation among countries observed in Figure 2 result in a standard deviation of 0.8 for the EPL index. We thus conclude that the EPL index exhibits considerable variation in our sample.
**** Insert
**** Insert Table III about here **** Panel A of Table III displays the summary statistics for the country, year sample while Panel B displays the same for the country, industry (2-digit SIC), year sample. Each panel lists the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum for both the proxies for privatization and the explanatory variables. We note that there is considerable variation in the number of privatization deals as well as the dollar value of the privatization deals both at the country, year and the country, industry, year levels.
Since our identification is based on country-level changes in EPL, we also display the summary statistics for these changes. We note that of the 364 country, year level observations, 57 correspond to changes in the EPL. Of these, 35 are EPL increases and 22 are EPL decreases.
IV. Results
We conduct our empirical tests at the country, year and country, industry, year levels to avoid econometric issues that manifest in tests at the firm level. Apart from the fact that neither EPL nor "effective EPL" varies at the firm-level, unobserved firm-specific factors coinciding with the timing of privatization would be a first-order determinant of whether or not a particular firm is privatized. Such unobserved firm-specific factors coinciding with the timing of privatization would cloud inference of the effect of EPL on privatization.
A. Basic Tests: Difference-in-Difference Estimates
We begin our investigation by examining the correlation between EPL and privatization using panel regressions containing country and year fixed effects:
where y ct is the measure of privatization for country c in year t, and α c and α t denote country and year fixed effects, respectively. EPL ct denotes the stringency of EPL based on the EPL index value for country c in year t. X ct denotes the set of control variables. Table IV shows the complete set of variables used in the regressions, as well as their description and the source for the variable.
**** Insert Table IV about here ****
The country fixed effects control for time-invariant unobserved factors at the country level, such as the possibility that a country's EPL may be correlated with its other laws and institutions. First, Botero, et al. (2004) find that a country's legal origin is strongly correlated with the stringency of that nation's labor laws. Specifically, civil law countries are more likely to have stringent labor laws than common law ones. Since a nation's legal origin is time invariant, the country fixed effects control for this. Second, the EPL measure captures the de jure effect of employment protection laws. However, the de facto effect may differ from that the de jure one due to the enforceability of EPL. To the extent that the difference between the de jure and de facto effects of EPL is time-invariant, the country fixed effects control for such differences. Third, the country fixed effects subsume the effect of other time-invariant legal variables highlighted by the law and finance literature (La Porta, et al., 1997 , 1998 , including rule of law, antidirector rights index, efficiency of the judicial system, days to enforce a contract, estimated cost of insolvency proceedings, and others (see La Porta, et al., 1998) . The year fixed effects control for common global trends in privatization.
These panel regressions implement a difference-in-difference test in a multiple-treatment-group, multiple-time-period setting as employed by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) . Thus, we measure the before-after difference in privatization in a country where EPL changes (the "treatment group") vis-à-vis this difference in a country where no such change occurs in the same year (the "control group"). As the EPL changes occur in different years in different countries, we exploit these staggered changes to estimate the difference-in-difference. Table V shows the results of the test of equation (1) using the number of privatization deals in a country, year in Columns 1-4 and the total value of privatization deals in a country, year (current US$ billions) in Columns 5-8. We use Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) regressions for the total value of privatization deals in a country, year since it is a continuous variable. However, we employ Poisson regressions for the number of deals, since the dependent variable is a count measure. 8 For both these variables, we find the coefficient on the EPL index to be negative and significant at the 1% level. This result indicates that strong EPL are negatively correlated with the value and number of privatization transactions, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2A, respectively. In unreported tests, we find that our results are equally strong when examining the correlation between EPL and number and value of privatizations conditional on at least one privatization having taken place in a country, year. In these regressions, we control for other country-level variables that may affect privatization. **** Insert Table V about here **** Country size: Poor countries tend to grow more rapidly than rich industrialized ones (Barro, 1991) , so the initial level of economic development in a country can impact the decision to privatize public enterprises by influencing economic growth in the country. Larger/richer countries may undertake more privatization because the economy is more diversified and less reliant on state-led industrial development. Therefore, we include the logarithm of GDP and the logarithm of the country's population to control for the nonlinear effect of a country's initial conditions on its privatization propensity; a simple normalization of our privatization proxies by the level of GDP/population would not account for such nonlinear effects. Consistent with these hypothesized effects, we find that the logarithm of a country's GDP is positively correlated with the number of privatizations. In other words, the number of privatization transactions in a country increases nonlinearly with the size of the country's economy.
Stock market development and creditor rights: Privatization might be easier in countries where stock markets and/or credit markets are well established. Also, Acharya and Subramanian (2009) find that weaker creditor protection fosters economic growth by encouraging more firm-level innovation. Since privatization may be less likely when economic growth in a country is quite robust, weaker creditor rights in a country could also lead to less privatization. We therefore control for these factors using the ratio of stock market total value traded to GDP and the time-varying index of creditor rights developed by Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer (2007) , respectively (our results are unchanged if we use Stock Market Turnover Ratio to proxy stock market development instead). Note that the number of observations in columns (2) and (3) of Table V are lower than those in columns (1) and (4), and similarly in columns (6) and (7) when compared to columns (5) and (8). The number of observations decreases in these specifications because the data for stock market turnover ratio are not available for 12 of the 14 countries in our sample until 1988. We find that privatization is correlated with lower credit market development, as seen in the negative coefficient of the creditor rights variable.
Inventory of privatizeable SOEs: Privatization may be impacted by "inventory depletion effects,"
or the likelihood that greater privatization up through time t-1 will reduce the inventory of privatizeable firms and thereby reduce the likelihood of privatization in time t. To account for this possibility, in columns (3) and (7) of Table V we include the cumulative number of privatizations until time t-1, as well as the cumulative value of privatizations up to time t-1. We find that, consistent with the depletion of inventory effect, the number of privatizations until time t-1 is negatively correlated with the number of privatizations during time t. However, once we condition on the number of privatizations through time t-1, a greater value obtained from privatization until time t-1 is positively correlated with the number of privatizations at time t. Governments undertaking privatization transactions may be fearful of the political fallout of "selling the family silver cheap," so higher prices obtained for privatized companies in the past may increase the government's willingness to privatize now. Thus, the finding that greater value obtained from privatization in the past increases the likelihood of privatization now is consistent with this effect.
Including the cumulative lags of the dependent variable may raise econometric concerns; we attempt to address this issue in Section IV.C by estimating a dynamic GMM model along the lines of Arellano and Bond (1991) .
B. Panel Regressions with Country-Specific Time Trends
To examine whether other country-level changes accompanying the EPL changes account for our results, we incorporate country-specific time trends, as follows:
Here α c *t denotes a time trend specific to each country c in our sample and the other variables are as defined in equation (1). This country-specific time trend accounts for several sources of endogeneity stemming from omitted variables. First, privatization deals tend to come in waves in most countries. If these country-specific privatization waves do not correlate with EPL changes, the effects estimated in Table V do not suffer from a bias. In fact, as can be seen in Figure 2 and in Table II , there has been no secular trend of either relaxing or tightening EPLs across our sample of countries. Changes in EPL among our sample of countries have indeed been bidirectional, becoming more stringent in some countries and more lenient in others. Even within the same country, we observe in Figure 2 that EPL changes have typically been bidirectional: becoming more stringent at some points and more lenient at others. Thus,
given the lack of a secular trend in the EPL changes within a country, even a secular trend of increasing privatization in each country in our sample cannot lead to a spurious correlation. Nevertheless, the country-specific trends allow the remote possibility that our results are due to a spurious correlation stemming from unidirectional changes in EPL in a few countries.
Second, if the enforceability of EPL changes at different rates in different countries during our sample period--the difference between the de jure and de facto effects of EPL is trending at different rates in different countries--the country-specific trends enable us to control for this.
Finally, since other country-level changes accompanying the employment protection law enactments could lead to country-specific time trends, these tests enable us to better isolate the pure effect of employment protection law changes on privatization. By accounting for country-specific time trends that may result from any of these omitted factors, we measure the correlation between EPL and privatization using deviations (at the country, year level) from the average time trend for each country.
Columns 4 and 8 of Table V show the results of the tests of equation (2).
Even after accounting for country-specific time trends, the coefficient of the EPL index remains negative and statistically significant. This provides robust evidence that the negative correlation between EPL and privatization documented in Section IV.A is unlikely to have been due to time-varying omitted variables at the country-level.
C. Economic Magnitudes
We estimate the economic magnitude of the effect of EPL on privatization using the coefficient of the EPL index in columns 1 and 5 of Table V . Since we have estimated the correlation between EPL and privatization by exploiting the changes in EPL within a country, we use the median value of EPL changes to estimate the economic effect on privatization. Across all EPL changes, both increases and decreases, we find that a median change in EPL is associated with a 7.6% change in the number of privatization transactions (n after /n before =exp[-0.782*0.1]=0.076) and a $105.3 million change in the total value of privatization deals in any given country in any given year (v after -v before =-1.053*0.1= -$0.1053 billion). Focusing only on the EPL increases, a median increase in EPL is associated with a 14.5%
decrease in the number of privatizations and a $210.6 million decrease in the total value of privatization deals in any given country in any given year. In contrast, if we focus only on the EPL decreases, a median decrease in EPL is associated with a 26.5% increase in the number of privatizations and a $315.9 million increase in the total value of privatization deals in any given country in any given year.
The higher economic magnitudes for EPL decreases vis-à-vis EPL increases can be rationalized along the following lines. Since decreases in EPL enable the newly privatized enterprise to shed excess labor more easily, proposed privatization transactions may wait for the EPL decrease to be manifested in law. In contrast, since an EPL increase makes it more difficult to fire excess labor, proposed privatization transactions would not wait for this EPL change to manifest in law. Thus, the queuing of privatization transactions waiting for EPL decreases probably explains its higher economic magnitude.
D. An Estimate of the Minimum Causal Effect
As we argued in Section II, while the supply-side effect of EPL on privatization possibly suffers from the econometric problems stemming from EPL and privatization being co-determined, the demandside effect is devoid of such concerns. Furthermore, supply-side effects oppose the demand-side effects with respect to the effect of EPL on the number of privatizations. Therefore, the presence of any supplyside effects, including those due to co-determination of EPL and privatization, stack the odds against us finding the negative effect of EPL on the number of privatization deals. Since we find a robust negative effect of EPL on the number of privatizations, this represents compelling evidence favoring the demandside effect, even after accounting for any possible econometric concerns stemming from EPL and privatization being co-determined. In fact, the economic magnitude of EPL on the number of privatizations that we documented above represents an underestimate of the causal effect of EPL on privatization in the presence of any supply-side and co-determination effects. Since investors take EPL as given and respond by setting their demand for privatization, the economic effects documented above provide minimum estimates of the causal effect of EPL on privatization.
Nevertheless, to buttress the claim that stringent EPL dampens privatization significantly, in the rest of the paper we conduct several additional tests to alleviate various econometric concerns. Since the main concern stems from the simultaneous determination of EPL and privatization, we investigate this first, then we examine the possibility of reverse causality as well.
E. Dynamic Panel Data Estimates Using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM Estimator
To relax the assumption of strict exogeneity in the fixed effects panel regressions, we follow
Gupta (2005) in estimating the dynamic GMM model developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) (henceforth AB) and the difference equation (1) to remove the fixed effect α c . We then use lagged levels of the dependent and pre-determined variable (EPL ct ) and differences of the strictly exogenous variables as instruments, and include all the available lags as instruments. Treating EPL ct as a predetermined variable implies that unobserved factors influencing privatization until time t in country c could be correlated with EPL ct . Therefore, this approach minimizes the potential for endogeneity of EPL due to the possibly simultaneous determination of EPL and privatization. In Table VI , we present the results of estimating the following AB specification:
which describes the effect of a change in EPL in country c at time t on the change in the value of privatization transactions in country c from time t onwards.
**** Insert Table VI about here **** Arellano and Bond (1991) show that the lagged dependent variables' values (levels) constitute legitimate instruments for the first-differenced variable, provided that the residuals from the regression are free from second-order serial correlation. Consistent with this, we find in the tests for second-order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals that the residuals are serially uncorrelated. From the p-values of the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, we note that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid (p-values range from 0.39 to 0.57).
Using this dynamic panel data estimator, we find that the negative effect of EPL on privatization remains statistically and economically significant. This is reassuring since Flannery and Hankins (2011) find that the GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) provide the most consistent estimates in the dynamic panel settings employed in corporate finance. Since the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator is not available for count data models, we are unable to estimate this specification for the number of privatizations.
F. Directly Accounting for Endogeneity of EPL Changes in the Fixed-Effects Panel Regressions
Having attempted to address concerns that EPL may be endogenously determined using the dynamic GMM approach, we now return to the fixed effects panel regressions to directly examine the possibility that EPL changes may be endogenous to country-level economic growth, changes in a country's government, trade liberalization, and/or the share of government production in overall national output. By accounting for factors that may be influencing EPL changes, we investigate using a bootstrap methodology whether the simultaneous determination of EPL and privatization on the supply-side affects the economic magnitude of the relationship between EPL and privatization.
F.1. Bootstrap Methodology to Examine the Effect of Simultaneity of EPL and Privatization
As argued in Section III, the supply-side channel through which EPL affect privatization suffers from the econometric concerns that EPL and privatization are simultaneously determined. Since the simultaneous determination of EPL and privatization on the supply-side could affect the causal estimate of the effect of EPL on privatization, we examine whether omitted factors that would lead to such simultaneity on the supply-side influence the economic magnitude of the impact of EPL on privatization.
To examine if these omitted factors affect the estimate of the effect of EPL on privatization, denote the omitted variable by Z ct and let's suppose that the true empirical relationship is captured by:
where (4) captures the fact that the omitted variable Z ct is correlated with EPL ct . By inverting (4), we get:
Thus, by substituting (4') into (3), the empirical relationship between EPL and privatization is given by:
By comparing (3') with equation (2), which we reproduce for ease of exposition:
we see that if the supply-side factors that lead to the simultaneous determination of EPL and privatization do not affect the economic effect of EPL on privatization, then γ 1 = β 1 (i.e., γ 2 ρ 1 =0), which implies the absence of omitted variable bias. To test whether β 1 = γ 1 , we employ a bootstrap methodology by running the following regression specification:
where X ct denotes the proxies for the omitted variables Z ct . Notice that the inclusion of these variables is the only difference between equation (5) and equation (2'). To test this hypothesis, we draw 1000 random samples of 300 observations each with replacement from the 364 observations that we originally used for running these regressions. By running regressions (2') and (5) on these samples, we get 1000 estimates of γ 1 and β 1 . Using these estimates, we do a simple test of equality of means and estimate the probability that the null hypothesis (γ 1 = β 1 ) cannot be rejected.
F.2. Correlation of EPL Changes to GDP Growth
In examining the effect of EPL on privatization, controlling for economic growth in a country is crucial since privatization of state-owned enterprises may be a government response to a slowdown in economic growth in a country. First, when governments become too large or overextended and build up unnecessary layers of bureaucracy, privatization may be a response aimed at reducing government's size and sway. This downsizing aspect of privatization is important since bad government policies and government corruption can have a large, negative impact on economic growth. Thus, when economic growth slows, countries may resort to privatization to reduce the negative impact of government ownership on economic growth (see, for example, Borisova and Megginson, 2011) . Second, privatizations effected through public share offerings contribute to stock market development (Boutchkova and Megginson, 2001; Bortolotti and Faccio, 2009 ). Since stock market development has been shown to have a significantly positive effect on economic growth (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998, and others), privatization can promote growth through its impact on stock market development.
Third, studies on post-privatization performance suggest that newly privatized firms increase their investment expenditures significantly, thereby boosting national investment spending and economic growth (Megginson and Netter, 2001; Estrin, et al., 2009 ). Finally, additional revenues to the government from privatization proceeds may lead to increases in investment in infrastructure, a reduction in budget deficits, and a generally positive effect on aggregate productivity and economic growth.
A more critical concern is that a country's growth rate could not only influence privatization outcomes but also affect the passage of EPL. For instance, Saint-Paul (2002) asserts that a higher economic growth rate reduces the political support for EPL because it increases the cost in the form of lower wages. However, since incumbent workers are most fearful of losing jobs during periods of slow economic growth, the political support for EPL should be high in such periods. As empirical support for his thesis, Saint-Paul (2002) points out that in many European countries employment protection increased in the early 1970s and proved very difficult to reduce in the 1980s since this was a period of slow growth.
Thus, from our perspective, slowing economic growth may lead both to greater privatization as well as increases in the stringency of EPL. Therefore, in Columns 1 and 2 of Table VII, we include the contemporaneous GDP growth rate of the economy as well as the GDP growth rate in the previous year.
We find that while GDP growth is uncorrelated with the value of privatization transactions, it is positively correlated with the number of privatization transactions, which is consistent with privatization and GDP growth being positively correlated with each other. Crucially, however, we find the negative effect of EPL on privatization to be as strong as before. Furthermore, we find in Columns 1 and 2 of Table VII using the bootstrap methodology that the null hypothesis that γ 1 = β 1 cannot be rejected. Table VII about here ****
**** Insert
F.3. Correlation of EPL Changes to Changes in Government
An important concern stems from the fact that changes in a country's EPL are likely to be correlated with changes in elected governments. In particular, to cater to their political constituencies, more left-leaning governments may be inclined to strengthen labor laws. Botero, et al. (2004) find that labor market regulation is often driven by political considerations: countries with a longer history of leftist governments have more stringent labor regulation.
Since leftist governments are less likely to privatize public enterprises, it is possible that the effect of EPL on privatization documented above is, in fact, caused by other factors coinciding with changes in government rather than changes in EPL. We examine this concern by including time-varying proxies for the political leanings of a country's government. These variables are constructed using the variable Government from Armingeon, Gerber, Leimgruber, and Beyeler (2008), which captures the balance of power between left and right-leaning parties in a given country's parliament. 9 This variable takes values from one to five, with one denoting hegemony by right-wing parties, and five denoting hegemony by social-democratic and other left parties. As expected, EPL is strengthened in a country when the government is leftist in its political leanings (the correlation of Government Political Ideology and EPL is 0.20).
Columns 3 and 4 of Table VII show the results of tests adding the contemporaneous and the oneyear lagged measures of the Government Political Ideology variable. We find that privatization is lower under leftist governments, which is consistent with such governments deriving their political support from worker groups and such groups being opposed to privatization. Crucially, however, we observe that the coefficient on the employment protection law index remains negative and statistically significant at the 5% level or better even after controlling for government political orientation. Furthermore, we find in Columns 3 and 4 of Table VII using the bootstrap methodology that the null hypothesis that γ 1 = β 1 cannot be rejected.
F.4. Correlation of EPL Changes to Trade Reforms
Since trade liberalization in a country may result in job losses, governments may enact stringent Table VII shows the result of tests adding both these variables. We notice that increasing openness in a country's trade, as captured by the level of its imports and exports relative to GDP, is positively correlated with the level of privatization in the country. Furthermore, the nation's exchange rate, which also reflects the country's trade openness, is positively correlated with the level of privatization. However, the openness variable is statistically significant only when using the number of privatization deals as the dependent variable, and the exchange rate variable is statistically significant only when using the value of privatization deals as the dependent variable. Importantly, we observe that the coefficient on the employment protection law index remains negative and significant at the 1% level even when these openness and trade variables are included. Furthermore, we find in Column 5 of Table   VII using the bootstrap methodology that the null hypothesis that γ 1 = β 1 cannot be rejected.
F.5. Correlation of EPL Changes to Government Share in Production
The economic growth literature suggests that a measure of government involvement in economic production serves as a proxy for the level of political corruption in the country (Cook and Uchida, 2003; Filipovic, 2005) . Greater political corruption may lead governments to enact stringent EPL in order to cater to their political constituencies. Similarly, political pressure exerted by influential groups may force the government to avoid privatization. We control for this source of endogeneity by including the share of government production in a country's GDP each year. Column 6 of Table VII shows the result of tests adding this variable. We find that greater government involvement in production is negatively correlated with privatization, albeit weakly. Crucially, however, we observe that the coefficient on the employment protection law index remains negative and significant at the 1% level with the government production variable included. Furthermore, we find in Column 6 of Table VII using the bootstrap methodology that the null hypothesis that γ 1 = β 1 cannot be rejected.
In sum, using the dynamic GMM methodology, as well as by directly accounting for endogeneity in the fixed effects panel regressions, we find that the economic effect of EPL on privatization estimated in Table V is unlikely to be driven by the simultaneity of EPL and privatization.
G. Country-by-Country Analyses of Possible Co-determination of EPL Changes and Privatization
In this section, we study the inter-temporal linkages between the timing of privatization programs and changes in EPL for each country in our sample to further investigate the possibility of EPL and privatization being simultaneously determined. Such simultaneous determination could have resulted from a change in national government that brings an ideologically charged party to power. This arguably is the case for the Thatcher government in the United Kingdom; elected in 1979, it implemented dramatic reductions in Britain's EPLs-which were already fairly weak compared to contemporaneous laws in most other EU countries-and also adopted an increasingly sweeping privatization program over the years [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . Both major policy changes were motivated by the same powerful liberalizing impulse, and so it might be argued that EPL changes did not actually cause changes in privatization scale and frequency, but instead both were co-determined.
Was the "Thatcher phenomenon" an exception or the norm? To examine this question, we compare the timing of changes in EPL shown in Figure 2 with the timing of national privatization program waves described in Megginson (2005) and the Privatization Barometer database. Such a comparison reveals no other example where the beginning or ending of a national privatization wave coincided sharply with major changes in a nation's EPL. In Germany and Italy, the largest EPL reductions followed significant privatization program initiations, while in Austria, Belgium, Greece, and Sweden more stringent EPL were enacted years before the largest privatization programs began. While Sweden subsequently reduced EPL stringency before a second privatization wave began in the early 1990s, both policy changes may have been prompted more by the financial crisis that led Sweden to nationalize its banks in 1992 and then re-privatize them years later. EPL stringency declined more or less continuously (with brief upward jumps) for both Spain and Denmark over the 1978-2003 study period, but both countries' major privatization waves began several years after these EPL changes were begun. EPL were very stable throughout most of the study period (again with brief upticks) for both Ireland and Portugal, In tests that we have omitted for brevity, we investigate whether the results change when we exclude Britain, France, and the Netherlands from the sample and find that our results are very similar with or without these three countries. Therefore, we conclude that possible co-determination of EPL and privatization does not account for our results.
H. Tests highlighting the causal mechanism
Having examined the effect of employment protection laws on privatization, we now describe our tests of the causal mechanism that leads to the main effect.
H.1. Inter-Industry Differences Based on Hiring and Separation Rates
We now examine Hypotheses 1 and 2 by exploiting inter-industry differences in the effectiveness of EPL in influencing privatization. In industries where the possibility of employee retrenchment is higher, perhaps for technological reasons, stronger EPL would impose hurdles on layoff of employees even if new private owners might need to retrench employees in greater numbers. Thus stringent EPL may impose disproportionately more hurdles in achieving the efficient level of employment in such industries. On the supply-side, stringent EPL may be relatively more material in assuaging organized labor's fears of retrenchment in the industries where retrenchment rates are higher. Therefore, both the supply-side and demand-side effects would be felt disproportionately more in industries where the fear of employee retrenchment is greater. To exploit industry level differences in the power and relevance of EPL, we interact the country-level EPL with the fear of employee retrenchment in an industry to generate a country, industry, year level measure of "effective EPL." We then conduct tests at the country, industry, year level using this measure of "effective EPL."
In industries characterized by high hiring rates, the fear of losing jobs is reduced as the employees face less difficulty in finding a new job in the same industry. Thus, workers in such industries have more secure employment prospects. Conversely, in industries characterized by high employee separation rates, workers' employment prospects are less secure. Therefore, we use lower hiring and higher separation rates separately as proxies for greater fear of employment loss due to retrenchment in an industry.
The data for hiring and separation rates comes from Bassanini, et. al. (2009) , who define the hiring and separation rates as the annual rate of inflow and outflow of workers from that industry, respectively. They generate a time invariant measure of the hiring and separation rates by calculating the average of these variables over the period 2000-07 for each industry in each country in Europe. Using these data, we construct time-invariant dummy variables to classify industries into those where hiring is high or low. Industries where the hiring rate is greater than the median hiring rate across all industries in a country are classified as high, while those industries with below median hiring rates are classified as low.
The classification of industries into those with high or low separation rates is done identically. Since the correlation between industries that rank high on separation and those that rank high on hiring is 0.47, industries with high hiring rates are not necessarily always the ones with high separation rates as well. We therefore run separate tests exploiting inter-industry differences based on both measures: (5) where β 1 and β 2 measure the coefficient of "effective EPL" on privatization when the "effective EPL" is high and low, respectively. Table VIII Using the coefficients in column 1, we estimate the economic magnitude of EPL on the number of privatizations in low-hiring industries to be about 50% greater than the effect of EPL in high-hiring industries. Using the coefficients in column 2, we estimate the economic magnitude of EPL on value of privatizations in low hiring industries to be about four times larger than the effect of EPL in high hiring industries. Thus we find that the effect of EPL is disproportionately more in industries where hiring is low. In other words, privatization is lower in country, industry pairs where "effective EPL" is greater, which is consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2A, again suggesting that the demand-side effects of EPL dominate the supply-side effects. In columns 3 and 4, we find similar results using differences in the rate of separation across industries to create proxies for "effective EPL." **** Insert Table VIII about here ****
H.2. Inter-industry Differences Using U.S. Industry Measures as Instruments
In an attempt to further address concerns of endogeneity in the fixed effects panel regressions, we exploit the fact that the United States does not form part of our sample. Therefore, industry-level measures for the U.S. that proxy fear of retrenchment are unlikely to be correlated in unobserved ways with the privatization outcomes in any country in our sample. Furthermore, such industry-level measures for the U.S. are unlikely to be correlated with unobserved factors coinciding with the changes in EPL in any country in our sample. Since the efficiency gains from shedding excess labor would be the greatest in less productive industries, the fear of retrenchment would be greater in the less productive industries than in the more productive ones. Therefore, productivity measures for U.S. industries serve as an exogenous proxy for the fear of retrenchment in industry. As argued above, they satisfy the exclusion restrictions required for an instrumental variable. However, due to the underlying technology in an industry being similar across different countries, the industry-level productivity measures computed for the U.S. are likely to be correlated with the productivity measures in an industry in a country in our sample. In fact, we find this correlation to be 0.62. Therefore, the interaction of the country-level EPL with the level of productivity in the matched U.S. industry provides us an exogenous measure of "effective EPL." We now undertake triple-difference tests as in equations (4) and (5) (6) where β 2 is the variable of interest since it measures the coefficient of "effective EPL" on privatization.
We use output per hour as well as output per worker as measures of productivity. Columns 1 and 3 of Table IX show the results of estimating equation 6 using output per worker as the proxy for productivity of labor. We find that the coefficient of the interaction term is consistently and significantly positive. Since the coefficient of the EPL index variable is significantly negative, this implies that the marginal effect of the EPL index is greater in an industry where employee productivity is low than in industry where employee productivity is high. In an industry where output per worker is equal to the median (88.7, where the output per worker in 2002 is indexed to 100), columns 1 and 3 show the coefficients of the EPL index to be -0.7655 (=-2.983+0.025*88.7) and -0.0272 (=-0.382+0.004*88.7) for the number of deals and the value of deals, respectively. For an industry in which the output per worker is one standard deviation lower than the median (which equals 76.6 using the standard deviation from panel B of Table III) , the coefficients of the EPL index are -1.068 and -0.0756 for number and value of deals, respectively. Therefore, a one standard deviation decrease in the output per worker increases the marginal effect of EPL on the number of deals by approximately 39.5% and more than doubles the marginal effect of EPL on the value of deals. Using output per hour as an alternate measure of labor productivity yields similar results, both in magnitude and significance. Columns 2 and 4 of Table IX show the results of these tests. We thus conclude that the effect of EPL is more pronounced in less productive industries, where the fear of retrenchment is greater than in higher productivity industries, where the fear of retrenchment is less. This is consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2A.
**** Insert Table IX about here ****
I. Possible Reverse-Causality and the Dynamic effects of EPL Changes on Privatization
Until the changes to EPL become effective, legal hurdles relating to firing excess workers do not change. For this reason, possible reverse causality--the possibility that EPL were enacted in anticipation of future privatization transactions--is unlikely to be a significant concern in our fixed effects regressions.
Nevertheless, it is useful to examine the dynamic aspects of the effect of the employment protection law changes.
First, in Table X , we examine the correlation of privatization until time t-1 on EPL at time t after including country and year fixed effects using the following specification:
Consistent with the argument put forward before that left-wing governments are more likely to strengthen EPL, we find EPL to be positively correlated with a government's political ideology. Furthermore, EPL are positively correlated with country size, as seen in the positive coefficient of the log of population, but negatively correlated with the share of government in production and with trade liberalization. Crucially, however, we find that privatization until time t-1 is not correlated with EPL changes at time t.
**** Insert Table X about here ****
To examine the long-run effects of EPL on privatization, we run in Table XI specifications where instead of the contemporaneous value of the EPL index EPL ct , we include its lagged value EPL c,t-1 to examine the effect of EPL one year after their passage:
The coefficient of the regression of y ict on EPL c,t-1 (β 1 ) captures the relation between privatization in year t and EPL passed in year t-1, or the effect on privatization one year after the law's enactment. Columns 1-2 of Table X show the results from estimating equation 7. We notice that the coefficient of EPL c,t-1 is negative and statistically significant. **** Insert Table XI about here **** Next, we include the 2-year lagged value EPL c,t-2 to examine the effect of EPL two years after their enactment:
Columns 3-4 of Table XI show the results from estimating equation 8, where we notice that the coefficient of EPL c,t-2 is once again negative and statistically significant.
Thus, while privatization through time t-1 does not affect EPL at time t, EPL at time t does affect privatization contemporaneously and through two years after. The evidence in this section thus suggests that the direction of causality runs from EPL to privatization and not vice-versa.
J. Relative Effect of EPL Decreases versus EPL Increases
As argued in Section III, a newly privatized public enterprise may need to shed its excess labor in order to enhance efficiency and thus create shareholder value. Since decreases in EPL enable the newly privatized enterprise to shed excess labor more easily, proposed privatization transactions may wait for the EPL decrease to be manifested in law. Therefore, a significant number of privatizations would be expected to occur in the year of the EPL decrease itself. In contrast, since an EPL increase makes it more difficult to fire excess labor, proposed privatization transactions would not wait for this EPL change to manifest in law. To examine these potential differences in the effect of EPL increases and EPL decreases, we distinguish the periods of increasing EPL from periods of decreasing EPL: 
Column 1 of Table XII shows the results from estimating equation 9 for the number of privatization transactions. Using the coefficients in column 1, we find that a one standard deviation decrease in EPL increases the number of privatization transactions by one in a given country in a given year (n after /n before =exp[-0.864*-0.79]=1.98 => n after =1.98n before =1.98 using median value of n before =1), while a standard deviation increase in EPL reduces the number of deals by 0.5 in a given country in a given year (n after /n before =exp[-0.864*0.79]=0.5198 => n after =0.51n before =0.51 using median value of n before =1).
**** Insert Table XII about here ****
To examine differential effects of EPL decreases versus EPL increases one year after the EPL change, we repeat the above test using the lagged value of EPL and the change in EPL from time period (t-2) to (t-1):
* EPL c,t-1 *(EPL c,t-1 < EPL c,t-2 ) + β 2 * EPL c,t-1 *(EPL c,t-1 >= EPL c,t-2 ) (11)
Column 2 of Table XII shows the results of estimating equation 10 for the number of privatization transactions. In this case, while the coefficient of EPL increases (β 2 ) is statistically significant (though of a lower magnitude), the coefficient of EPL decreases (β 1 ) is not statistically significant. This implies that an increase in EPL this year will have an effect on the number of privatizations both in the current year and the next, but a decrease in EPL does not have this lasting effect, which is consistent with the differential effects of EPL increases and decreases hypothesized above.
In columns 3 and 4 of Table XII , we test equations 6 and 7 using the dollar value of privatization transactions. We find that while a one standard deviation increase in EPL decreases the value of privatization transactions by $952 million (=-1.206*0.79), a one standard deviation decrease in EPL increases the value of privatization transactions by $766 million (=-0.970*-0.79) in a given country in a given year. We find this difference not to be statistically significant, which suggests that the differential effects observed with respect to the number of privatization transactions is not observed with respect to the value of the transactions. With respect to the value of the privatization transactions, we would find differential dynamic effects only if the higher value transactions wait for the legal change to be manifested in law while the lower value transactions do not do so, or vice versa. Our results suggest that there is no such systematic difference with respect to the value of transactions.
K. Employment Protection Laws versus Other Labor Laws
To reassure ourselves that the above documented effects of EPL are not the artifact of other facets of labor laws, we use an alternative index of labor laws compiled by Deakin, et. al. (2007) , who decompose labor laws in a country into five sub-components capturing laws that regulate: (i) alternative employment contracts; (ii) regulation of work time; (iii) regulation of dismissal; (iv) employee representation; and (v) industrial action. Since the first three components relate to employment protection as in Allard (2005), we combine them to generate a measure of employment protection using this alternative index. The other two components then combine to provide an index of labor laws that are separate from employment protection. Since the Deakin, et. al. index is available only for five countries (France, Germany, India, United Kingdom, and the United States), using this index restricts our sample to only the three European countries: Germany, France, and United Kingdom. We run the following specifications to capture the contemporaneous as well as lagged effects of employment protection and other labor laws:
where t' = {t, t-1, t-2}.
Across columns (1) - (6) of Table XIII , we find that the coefficient of "Deakin Employment
Protection" is negative and statistically significant while the coefficient of "Other Labor Laws" is weakly positive. This further corroborates our previous findings, albeit for a smaller sample, that it is indeed laws governing employment protection that inhibit privatization and not the other aspects of labor laws. This result is particularly reassuring because Saint-Paul (2002) asserts that "one expects employment protection to prevail in countries with more rigid labor markets. In other words, there exists a 'complementarity' between firing costs and other labor market rigidities." By including other dimensions of labor laws together with EPL, we are able to show that the effect of EPL on privatization stays robust even after we control for possible complementarities between firing costs and other labor market rigidities using "Other Labor Laws." **** Insert Table XIII about here ****
L. Additional Robustness Tests
L.1. Traditional Difference-in-Difference Tests
Having documented the negative effect of EPL on privatization using the full sample, we now examine this relationship using traditional two-country difference-in-difference tests. For each country that undertakes a significant degree of privatization, we study the before-after effect of a change in EPL in the country where EPL changes (the "treatment group") vis-à-vis the before-after effect in a country where no employment protection law changes occur around the period of change (the "control group").
As seen in Table I , Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are the countries with the largest privatization programs, both in terms of the number and dollar value of privatization transactions during our sample period.
As seen in Figure 2 , EPL in Germany, Italy, Spain, and Sweden change over the period 1986 to 2002. However, the United Kingdom does not change its EPL during the time period 1986 to 1997.
Therefore, we conduct four separate sets of two-country difference-in-difference tests using the United Kingdom as the control group to examine the effect of employment protection changes in Germany, Italy, Spain, and Sweden over the time period 1986 to 1997. We employ the following specification, which is identical to that in equation (1) except that it only includes the treatment country and the control country: Table XIIVI shows the results of these two-country difference-in-difference tests. Panel A shows the difference-in-difference tests using the value of the privatization transactions as the dependent variable while Panel B uses the number of privatization transactions as the dependent variable. We see that the effect of EPL on privatization is negative and statistically significant using both the number of privatization deals and the dollar value of the privatization transactions.
**** Insert Table XIVII about here ****
L.2. Average Effect of EPL on Privatization over Three-Year Windows
To account for the fact that the effects of a labor law change on privatization could be longlasting, we estimate the effect of EPL on privatization by using average values of EPL and the privatization proxies over three-year periods. Doing so enables us to smooth out the effect of any sudden changes in either the EPL index or the privatization measures. We construct the average EPL measure as:
EPL s = (EPL t + EPL t+1 + EPL t+2 )/3 (14)
where the subscript s represents the sequential three-year periods 1978 -1980, 1979 -1981 , … in an overlapping window set-up. We also employ a non-overlapping window where s represents the periods 1978 -1980, 1981 -1983, 1984 -1986, . .. The average values for privatization proxies are also calculated in a similar way with the number of deals being rounded off to the nearest integer. We run the following specification:
Results of estimating equation (8) are presented in Table XIV . We find the coefficient on EPL to be negative and significant at the 10% level or better, which suggests that even after accounting for possible noise in the EPL changes by averaging them over three-year periods, the negative effect of EPL on privatization remains strong. Furthermore, we notice that the coefficient of EPL is very similar to those estimated in our basic tests in Table V . sectors and the fact that such groups of workers exert considerable political pressure, we find that stringent employment protection laws inhibit privatization disproportionately more in industries that are less productive, require lower level of job skill, and are more unionized.
We contribute to the law and finance and privatization literatures by being the first to examine the effect of country-level labor laws on privatization. Specifically, we investigate how laws that affect a key relationship inside corporations-that between employers and employees-impacts the transition of corporate ownership from the state to private entities. Since we utilize the universe of all privatization transactions and all employment protection law changes in the fourteen European countries for which we obtain data, we are able to document a robust correlation between these two key country-level variables.
Using the universe of all employment protection changes does not come without a cost, however: the law changes in our study do not provide strictly exogenous variation in employment protection laws. While we attempt and make substantial progress in identifying the causal relationship between employment protection laws and privatization by accounting for such endogeneity in several ways, studies using natural experiments that provide "exogenous" variation in employment protection laws would be able to nail the causal connection, albeit in a specialized setting. Thus, such studies would serve as an effective complement to our study. Furthermore, studies examining the effect on privatization of other laws, such as those that affect the protection offered to minority shareholders and laws relating to takeover of firms, would enhance our understanding of the effects of the legal environment in a country on such an important country-level policy variable as privatization. We suggest these as areas for future research. The period of service to claim unfair dismissal increased to two years from six months. 
S. as an Instrument
The number of deals and value of deals are aggregated at the country, industry, and year level. Columns 1 and 3 report the results of interaction with output per employee while Columns 2 and 4 report the results of interaction with output per workerPoisson regressions are carried out for number of deals. Industry fixed effects are computed at the 2-digit SIC level. Standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered by (country, year). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Since the data on labor productivity is available only from 1987, this sample includes privatization deals over the period 1987 -2003 where the subscript s represents the sequential three-year periods 1978 -1980, 1979 -1981, … in an overlapping window set-up in Columns 1 and 2. Columns 3 and 4 employ a non-overlapping window, where s represents the periods 1978 -1980, 1981 -1983, 1984 -1986, . .. The average values for privatization proxies are also calculated in a similar way with the number of deals being rounded off to the nearest integer. Poisson regressions are carried out for number of deals. Standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered by country; ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
